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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah,
Plaintiff & Respondent,
vs.
HUBERT C. LAMBERT, State
Engineer of the State of
Utah; PROVO RIVER WATER USERS
ASSOCIATION, a corporation;
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
a corporation; SALT LAKE CITY,:
a municipal corporation,
CENTRAL UTAH \•TATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT; UTAH LAKE DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, a corpora- :
tion; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DEPART-:
MENT OF THE INTERIOR; HUGH
McKELLAR, as Provo River Commissioner; and PROVO RESERVOIR WATER USERS COHPANY, a
corporation,

CASE NO. 14,605

Defendants & Appellants.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
STATEHENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to review in its entirety, and not in
part as the appellants have stated, the decision of the
State Engineer relative to Provo City's right to water under
paragraph 4(c) of the "Provo River Decree" of May 2, 1921.
The general characterization by the appellants under this
heading is erroneous.
DISPOSITION BY STATE ENGINEER
While this particular subdivision (Disposition by State
Sponsored by the S.J.is
Quinney
Law prescribed
Library. Funding for digitization
provided by theby
Institute
of Museum
Library Services
Engineer)
not
for briefs
the
UtahandRules
of
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-Civil Procedure, the respondent has no objection to such
discussion, except that the facts should be reported accurately.
1.

The corrected facts are:
In September, 1969, appellant Hugh A. McKellar,

then Provo River Water Commissioner, unilaterally, ex parte,
sua sponte and without authority, made the unprecedented
determination that Provo City's right to 16.5 c.f.s. under
the Morse Decree of May 2,

1~21,

was a non-consumptive right

and, accordingly refused to deliver such water to Provo
City.
2.

Representatives of Provo City attempted to reason

with Mr. McKellar, but their efforts were to no avail.
3.

Mr. Richard Maxfield, then special counsel for

Provo City, called the State Engineer's office and talked
with Mr. Bryce Montgomery, who was acting State Engineer
during the illness of Mr. Lambert.

After reviewing the

record, Mr. r.fontgomery wrote f.lr. McKellar on September 19,
1969, and told him to redivert the 16.5 c.f.s. to Provo
City. (Ex. 21).
4.

Mr. McKellar notified Mr. Mendenhall, manager of

the Provo Reservoir Water Users Company, of the decision.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Joseph Novak filed an objection wiili
the State Engineer.

This objection developed into a legalis-

tic hearing involving the interpretation of paragraph 4(c)
of the Decree.
5.

On May 1, 1970, the State Engineer rendered his

decision, holding that paragraph 4(c) of the Provo River

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Decree was for non-consumptive power use only.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the first disposition before the Honorable Allen B.
Sorenson, the matter was presented on motions for summary
judgment made by each side.

No testimony was taken.

defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted.

The
On

remand, the Trial Court found in favor of the plaintiffrespondent.
The balance of the appellants' chronology concerning
the disposition in the lower court is substantially correct.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have the judgment of the lower
court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants commence their statement of fact by
stating that they will "strive to comply with the timehonored rules of appellee (sic) review and state those facts
in the light most favorable to the Amended Findings of Fact
and Amended Judgment below".

After such a lofty pronounce-

ment of purpose, the appellants then proceed to ignore
salient evidence and testimony and to tailor the facts to
their liking.

For that reason, the respondent must make the

following and somewhat lengthy restatement of facts.
On August 7, 1972, this Court remanded the cause to the
Trial Court with this language:
"It is therefore ordered that this matter be
remanded to the District Court with the recommendation
court
the
matter
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. that
Funding forthe
digitization
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and Library Services
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to the State Engineer for a determination
from the historical or other data, or from
other investigation as to the use, if any,
made of the water here in question." (R.
217A).
On September 22, 1972, the trial Court ordered the case
referred to the State Engineer for "such determination as
may be helpful in liew (sic) of the decision of the Supreme
Court."

The Court obviously intended the word "light"

instead of "lieu".
Mr. Hubert

c.

Lambert, the previous engineer died on

March 5, 1973 and thereafter, on

c.

May 1, 1973, Mr. Dee

Hansen was appointed State Engineer.
After some prodding by Provo City, Mr. Hansen, the
State Engineer, conducted a hearing.

The hearing took

approximately a day and a half, the first day being January
8, 1975, and the second January 18, 1975.
rendered his report.

He thereafter

That report is undated and unsigned

but it was filed with the clerk of the court on June 18,
1975.
Provo City has the following observations, additions,
and corrections to the appellants' Statement of Facts,
taking the "facts" up in the order in which the appellants
have set them forth:
A.

General Statement re:

Geographical Locations.

Provo City does not object to appellants' general
statement of facts under this heading:
B.
~

Statement of Facts From Record of Civil

Before this Court on Prior Appeal.

~
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The difficulty with stating the facts in this manner is
that there was no record of testimony and evidence on the
prior appeal.

Further, by stating the so called facts this

way, the appellants can be truthful to the extent of the
"then" record, even though such "truth" is different than
the facts considered by the trial court.

It is essential,

therefore, that the salient facts (those considered by Judge
Tibbs) be considered along side the appellants' assumed
facts from Judge Sorenson's abbreviated record.
Contrary to the appellants' assertion that "no one
knows exactly how much acreage was irrigated by 4(c) water
in 1921", it does appear that there were hundreds of acres
irrigated by 4(c) water.

For example, there were a number

of blocks on both sides of the factory race,

(R. 973), on

the Third West diversion (R. 973), and blocks and open
acreage south of Sixth South (Railroad Street) from Fifth
West on the west to the arc made by the railroad track
running east and circling to the southeast and from this
west, north and east parameter south to Utah Lake, that were
irrigated by 4(c) water.

This area, however, excluded part

of the First Ward Pasture, which had a separate water right
under the Provo River Decree.

The line to the south fluctua-

ted because of the level of the lake; and sometimes hundreds
of acres south of the meander line were amenable to irrigation
(R.

967).

The city engineer, Hr. Zirbes, calculated the

number of acres amendable to irrigation in 1921 by use of
the
4(c)
water
toLibrary.
theFunding
Utah
Lake provided
meander
lineof Museum
to be
not Services
less
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney Law
for digitization
by the Institute
and Library
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than 1407.87 acres.

(R.

1270, Ex. 20).

acreage irrigated by rights under 4(a)
4,758 acres.

(R.

The total

(b) and (c) was

1270-1275, Ex. 20).

The interim decision of Judge Horse on November 26,
1917, is not material here for it was superseded by the
decree of May 2, 1921.

The asserted facts set forth on

pages 11, 12 and 13 of the appellants' brief are simply not
facts.

They were merely 1917 pre-trial stipulations which

were substantially changed by the Decree of 1921.

Cer-

tainly, there were some similarities between the stipulations
and the final decree but the appellants would be clairvoyant
to be able to say they were incorporated as such, sans
evidence and testimony, into the Provo River Decree.
C.

Statement of Facts Found £Y_ State Engineer

Pursuant to Referral from District Court.

-

--

Provo City protests this entire category of "facts" for
a number of reasons.

In the first place, it is an attempt

to masquerade as facts erroneous conclusions of the State
Engineer.

It isn't his "facts" that were found and from

which the appellants appeal, but rather those contained in
the Findings of Fact of the trial judge.

The Court, in its

Findings, found the State Engineer's report to be erroneous
in many particulars, among which were:

the number of acres

irrigated under the 4(c) right; the number of acres
irrigated out of the factory race; and the dates the manufacturing mills stopped using the strean for power.

(See

Findings of Fact, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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20, 21, and 22).
The appellants prefer to ignore the evidence that is
contrary to the State Engineer's Report.

In particular,

the court found all of the facts stated on page 13, 14 and
15 or appellants' brief under this heading, to be erroneous.
In light of the fact that the engineer had this matter under
investigation for nearly three years and conducted only a
cursory hearing, it would seem pretentious to postulate
that his conclusions concerning the "facts" make such conclusions "facts".
To quote "facts" which the court found to be erroneous
and against the weight of the evidence is not a "Statement
of Fact" no matter what title is attached.
The entire representation under this heading is contrary to the believable facts presented at trial and, therefore, should be ignored.
D.

Statement of Facts from Evidentiary Hearing in

District Court on the Use of the
Section

73-3~15,

~

Here in Question.

U.C.A. (1953), provides for a trial de

novo in the district court to review decisions of the state
engineer.

If the appeal to the District Court gives the

appellant a trial de novo , this subsection of appellant's
"Statement of Facts" should be the only statement of facts
to be considered.
Addressing ourselves to the facts before the Trial
Court, the respondent would add the following:
Both the State Engineer and the Provo City Water

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Department and Provo City Engineer attempted to identify the
number of acres irrigated by Provo City's 4(c) water.
calculation

methods used were different.

The

The State Engineer

attempted, by the use of a 1937 Provo City map,to work
backwards by identifying service ditches and then calculating
the acreages to be served by such laterals.

At best, his

estimates were interpolations and speculations.
Contrasted to the State Engineer's technique, Provo
City produced a variety of witnesses, to wit:

Dean Wheadon,

(R. 967), the transcript of Henry J. W. Goddard, George
Swan, Thomas E. Thompson. T. F. Wentz, Oscar

w.

c.

Thayre, (See

Exhibit 2), Earl J. Stubbs, (R. 1005), Leon Stubbs, (R.
1048), Elmer M. Roberts, (R. 1054) Judge naurice Harding (R.
1060), RobertS. worwood,
1135), Grants.

(R. 1114), John

w.

Goddard, (R.

Larsen (R. 1149) and Stanley A. Roberts,

(R. 1151), all of whom testified from actual knowledge of
the land irrigated by Provo City from the Factory Race.
From the testimony of the above named witnesses, coupled
with the testimony of Mr. Dean Wheadon, Director of Provo
City's Water Department and the testimony of Mr. Jack
Zirbes, Provo City Engineer, the evidence most favorable to
the city was that 4(c) water was used to irrigate a minimum
of 1,407.87 acres plus hundreds of acres of accretion ground
when the lake \~as belO\~ compromise.
20) (F. of F. 19 and 20).

(R.

1270, Ex. 18 and

These facts are contrary to the

appellants' assertion that the acreage irrigated by the
Factory Race was not identified.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Factory Race water was always used for irrigation.
Before the last mill went off stream in February, 1931, the
irrigation requirements of Provo City were sometimes fulfilled by putting the entire stream in other canals at
night in order to supply power water from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m., Mondays through Fridays.

(R.

1154).

That same power

water, when it passed the last mill, was utilized to water
the acreage south of Sixth South, as generally described on
pages 5 and 6 above.

None of the water was wasted.

The fact is, further, that the above arrangement was
not an exchange but rather an accommodation of the power
needs by the owners of the irrigation water.
9).

(R~

1182, Ex.

The right of the mill owners was by license from Provo

City, which did not own or operate one power· plant on the
Factory Race.

The assertion by the appellants that the

factory race water was only used for irrigation at night is
untrue.

(Appellants' brief, p. 13).

The evidence clearly

shows that all of the 4(c) water was used for irrigation,
whether diverted in the City Race, the East Union Canal or
sent down the Factory Race.

Only in periods of low water

was the night time and weekend accomodation utilized. These
facts are contrary to the appellants' assertion that power
water was exchanged for irrigation water.
The mills which used the Factory Race water for power
purposes began to shut down in 1921 when

E. J. Ward & Sons

went off stream and continued to February, 1930, when
Excelsor
Roller
Mills
ceased
to operate.
(R.
1246).
Sponsored by the S.J.
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In respect to Exhibits 14, 15(a) (b) and (c) the
appellants' statements concerning what the graphs represent
is generally correct except for a few vital particulars.
These are:
1.

The black line represents that portion of the water

shown by the red line which was actually diverted into the
Factory Race, vis a vis, Tanner Race.

(Appellant's Brief,

p. 19).
2.

Whenever the total water available, (red line) was

insufficient to meet Provo City's 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) right,
the distribution was made proportionately.

(Ex. 14).

By

use of Exhibits 15(a), (b) and (c), one can see that Provo
City always had a proportionate amount of 4(c) water in the
total water diverted.
3.

The hydrographic study, Exhibit 14, commences for

the year 1930.

By way of example, for the year 1930 it

shows, commencing July 1, 1930, that the water master only
put 5 c.f.s. down the Factory Race and on August 1st, he
reduced it to 2 c.f.s.

The stream was not used at all for

power thereafter.

4.

Every year recorded on Exhibit 14 shows that very

little of the 4(c) water was put down the Factory Race for
power purposes. (Black line).
5.

The 4(c) water, although delivered as reflected on

Exhibit 14, except for April, May and June of 1930, has
thereafter, until

~ugust

of 1969, been used exclusively for

irrigation purposes.
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Returning to the appellants' assertion that in 19371938 the total acreage under the Provo City canal system was
2,303.38 acres (R. 1381, 82), the respondent asserts that
this alleged fact is based upon the State Engineer's attempted reconstruction of the city system.

This conclusion

was not a fact, and, if it were, it would be irrelevant and
i~~aterial

for, at best, it shows his mathematics projected

on what he reconstructed the canal system to be in 1938.
The map itself, Exhibit "E", did not show the canal system
and he, the State Engineer, had to develop it by extrapolation.

He admitted that he had to do it this way because he

claimed that the earliest map he could obtain was a 1937
map.

(It should be noted that Ex. 19 is a 1921 map of

Provo.)
The appellants' statement that the Provo City canal
system in 1937-1938 would serve 2,303.38 acres ignores
believable evidence to the contrary.

The State Engineer in

his computations on Exhibit "E" left out hundreds of acres
of land south of Sixth South which were generally shown to
be irrigated on Provo City's Exhibit 3 and on Exhibit 18.
(R.

967, 1263).

The respondent's evidence demonstrated

that there was substantially more acreage irrigated by the
canal system in 1937-1938.
Because the amount of acreage irrigated under Provo
City's canal system in 1938 was immaterial to the issues
before the court, Provo City did not develop engineering
data on that subject. There was substantial reason to dis-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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believe the State Engineer's measurenents based upon his
own testimony.

To attempt to establish this conclusion of

the engineer as a fact is to mislead this Court as to the
"facts" of this case.
The appellants on page 10, under their statement of
facts, argue that, based on the Engineer's 1975 interpolated
reconstruction by use of a 1937 city map converted to 1921,
that the duty on 4(c) water would be 8.76 acres per acre
foot.

To the contrary, Provo City established by its

engineer, Mr. Zirbes, that the duty for 4(c) water based on
the minimum acreage to be watered, would be 85.3 acres per
acre foot.

(Ex. 20, R.

1275).

Facts that are material but which have not been

pr•mt.d

by the appellants are:
This Court in its remand was concerned with the
question of whether the 4(c) water was part of, or in
addition to, the 4(a) and 4(b) water.

All of the parties

agree and have stipulated that the 4(c) water is in addition
to the 4(a) and 4(b) rights.

(R. 946).

Appellant Hugh H. f·lcKellar was Provo River vlater
Commissioner in 1969.

In 1971, he was appointed Superin-

tendent of the principal appellant, Provo River Water Users
Association, at twice his previous salary.

(R. 869).

His

present employer was a principal beneficiary of his decision
to take Provo City's water.

(R. 875).

Mr. McKellar, unilaterally and without instruction from
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization
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I

mined that the 4(c) right was a non-consumptive right and
he, therefore, of his own initiative shut off the water.
(R. 946, 947, 948).

He did this notwithstanding the fact

that all of his predecessors for forty-nine previous years
had interpreted the Decree to the contrary.

(R. 945).

Mr. T. F. Wentz was Provo River Commissioner from 1912
to 1954.

(R. 919).

He was a principal witness in the Provo

River trial which lasted from 1912 to 1921 and resulted in
the Provo River Decree of May 2, 1921.

(R. 914).

Mr. Wentz

died in 1954 and was succeeded by Mr. Marion Clark who
served from 1954 to 1958.

Mr. Clark resigned and was fol-

lowed by !1r. \Val lace Wayman.
1968, he was

Upon 11r. Wayman's death in

succeedded by Mr. McKellar.

All of the Water Commissioners except Mr. McKellar
recognized the 4(c) right as a consumptive right for irrigation and delivered the 4(c) water to Provo City accordingly.

This was done for each year from 1921 through the

irrigation season of 1969, a period a few months short of
fifty years.
All of the persons who had personal knowledge of the
right in 1921 are dead.
Mr. Marion Clark, age 63 (R. 1085), who immediately
followed Mr. Wentz said that he was personally close to Mr.
Wentz from the time he was in the eighth grade.
He knew of his work concerning the river.

(R. 1107).

(R. 764, 1108).

He stated that he had delivered Mr. Wentz's records, including flow and distribution records to Mr. Wayman, his
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successor.

(R. 748).

He stated he had read and was

personally familiar with the Provo River Decree.
1086, 1108).
evidence.

(R. 749,

His flow sheet (Exhibit 8) was received in

(R. 1087, 1088, 1089).

The entire 16.5 c.f.s.

(4(c) water) was delivered to Provo City during his term and
those of his predecessors from 1921 through 1950 for irrigation purposes.

(R. 751).

Mr. Clark stated that Mr. Wentz' handwritten records
were turned over by him to Hr. Wayman, his successor.

He

stated that these documents supported his conclusions.
754).

(R.

Mr. Clark has tried to locate these but finds that "a

great deal of information had been removed from the files".
(R. 755, 1092).

The missing records were data sheets which

Mr. Wentz had accumulated for Judge Morse (R. 751), and the
documents supported his (Clark's) and Wentz' determination
that 4(c) was an independent irrigation right.

(R. 1094,

109 5) •
The Court took judicial notice of the Provo River
Commissioners' published reports for the period of 1921
through 1969, a period of 50 years, which show delivery of
4(c) water (16.5 c.f.s.) to Provo City for irrigation purposes.

(R. 751).

The Court received as evidence, Exhibit 1 (R. 958),
Provo City's underlying application for the 4(c) water,
which applications pre-dated the Decree.

The water that was

confirmed in Provo City by the Provo River Decree, Provision
4(c), was corroborated by this application which states as
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follows:
"B. The water has been used for the following
purposes:
Irrigation and for power purposes
on lands irrigated under Provo City System and
for power rights located on the Factory Race in
Provo - as designated in tentative decree of
Fourth District Court."
Attached to this application under "Explanation" was the
exact page from the Provo River Decree granting to Provo
City the 4(c) water.

The application was granted by the

State Engineer.
Mr. Vlheadon, Director of Provo City's Water Department,
testified that the 1921 maps and records of Provo City
indicated that there were 7,360 acres within Provo City in
1921 and that he had calculated that 5,280 acres were
amenable to irrigation.

By the use of Exhibit 3 (R. 967),

he set forth in orange diagonal lines the area encompassing
the 500 acres of city lots (Right 4(b) of Provo River Decree)
and in green diagonal lines the area irrigated by the 4(c)
right in 1921 (excluding the First Ward pasture) which he
estimated to be between 1200 and 1400 acres and probably up
to 20% greater.

(R. 973).

Exhibit 2 (R. 960) was a transcript of a portion of the
Provo River Decree covering the testimony of George C. Swan,
Henry J. 1•7. Goddard, Thomas E. Thompson, T. F. ~Jentz and
Oscar ltl. Thayre.
Mr. Swan was Provo City Engineer from 1912 to 1921.
(R. 981). On page 1580 of that transcript referring to the
Factory Race Mr. Swan said "it irrigates all of the land to
the Southwest - - east of the canal with the exception of
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the First Ward Pasture. lands".

He further testified the

water in the Factory Race was for irrigation purposes.

(R.

987, 983, 984, 985, 986).
In 1921, Mr. Goddard was 58 years old, had lived in
Provo all of his life, and was Provo City Commissioner in
charge of the water department.

He stated that the Factory

Race was used.for irrigation and power.

(R. 988 through

996).
Mr. Thomas E. Thompson, Provo City vlatermaster since
1914, testified that the Factory Race water was for irrigation.

(R. 996-1002).

Mr. T. F. Wentz, court appointed water commissioner for
the Provo River from 1913, testified that the Factory Race
stream was used for irrigation as well as power.

(R. 1991,

1882).
Mr. Oscar W. Flygare, master mechanic for Knight Woolen
Mills for 26 years, stated that the Factory Race water was
used for irrigation.
Witnesses were called by the Respondent who testified
that they were familiar with the Factory Race, sometimes
called the Mill Race, and that all of the 4(c) water was
used for irrigation from 1921 on and that none was wasted.
I

See Earl J. Stubbs (R. 1005 et seq.), Leon Stubbs, (R. 1048

j

I

et seq.) Elmer M. Roberts, (R. 1054 et seq.) John H. Goddard,;
I

(R. 1135 et seq.) Grant S. Larsen (R. 1119 et seq.) Stanley
H. Roberts, (R. 1151 et seq.).
All the Provo City Watermasters prior to 1962 are dead,
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however, the Provo City records and the testimony of watermaster Robert S. Horwood, who served as such after 1962, were
to the effect that all of the 16.5 c.f.s. was used for
irrigation and was not wasted.

(R. 1114, et seq.)

Respondent introduced an affidavit of the Mayor Hansen
of Provo City, dated September 8, 1925, four (4) years
after the entry of the Provo River Decree.
1182).

(Exhibit 9, R.

The affidavit was in the form of a protest by Provo

City against an application by Columbia Steel Corporation to
the State Engineer to appropriate water flowing in the
Factory Race.

In paragraph 3 of that protest, the mayor

declared that those making power use of the Factory Race had
done so under license from Provo City for more than thirtyfive (35) years.

He affirmed, under oath, that all of the

water in the Factory Race had been used for irrigation
purposes during certain times of every year since the licenses
were granted to the various power users.

In paragraph 4, he

further declared that at those times, none of the water was
available to the power users, who were thus compelled to
employ electricity or steam power.

rtayor Hansen also affir-

med in paragraph 4 that all of the waters so diverted from
the Factory Race were necessarily and beneficially used for
irrigation purposes.
The plaintiff-respondent introduced a sequence of
documents from a variety of sources which uniformly imply
that the 4(c) right of the Provo River Decree was for both
irrigation and power purposes.

(Exhibits 10, 11, 13; R.
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Exhibit 10 was a summary of Provo City's water rights
compiled in 1935 by T. F. Hentz, Provo River Conmissioner
from about 1941 to 1952.

It clearly designated the 4{c)

right of 16.5 c.f.s. as one to be used for irrigation and
power during the irrigation season.

{R. 1189,

Exhibit 10,

paragraph c.) Exhibit 11 was a similar conpilation
1940, al~o prepared by T. F. Wentz.

for

It revealed that Mr.

Wentz understood the 4{c) right to be one for both power and
irrigation purposes.

{R. 1191.).

The same view of that right was held by the Provo City
Engineer in 1946.

In a 1946 letter to Hr. Wentz, the

Engineer directed the Commissioner to satisfy the City's
contractual obligation to deliver water to one Mrs. Esthma
Tanner from the 16.5 c.f.s. of paragraph 4{c).

{R. 1194).

In Exhibit 13, the City presented a compilation of
documents taken from the records of each of the four Provo
River Commissioners between 1914 and 1969.

The documents

outline the distributions of Provo River water planned by
the Commissioner.

The 1951 plans of Mr. Wentz, commissioner

from 1914-1952, are on page 2 of Exhibit 13.

The water

distribution plans of Hr. Clark, Commissioner from 19531958, are on page 3.

Mr. Wayman, Commissioner from 1959-

1967, made plans for 1962 which are on page 1 of Exhibit 13.
The 1968 and 1969 plans of Mr. McKellar, Commissioner from
1968 to 1971, are found on pages 4 and 5 of the Exhibit.
Collectively and individually, the water distribution pla·s
through 1968 indicate that Provo City's rights were for both
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irrigation and power.

There was no indication that any of

the rights were considered non-consumptive power rights
until 1969, when Mr. McKellar refused to deliver the 16.5
c.f.s and labelled it a power use in his distribution outline.

(Page 5 of Exhibit 13).
It was established beyond doubt that the last mill

ceased to operate in February, 1930, and that the Factory
Race water had not been a power source since that time.

(R.

1237, 1238, 1241-1243, 1246, 1249).
Mr. John A. Zirbes, Provo City Engineer, identified
Exhibit 18 as an aerial photograph of Provo City, with all
irrigation ditches marked and labeled.

He identified the

legend attached thereto as a summary of the City's class A
water rights including the 4(c) right, as the City believes
them to be.

(R. 1259-1260). Mr. Zirbes also identified

Exhibit 19 as a 1921 map of Provo City.

(R. 1270).

He

testified that the area within the city, as bounded on the
north, east and west by the red line, and on the south by
Utah Lake, (approximately the bottom of the map) was 4758
acres.

(R. 1270).

He further described his calculations

(as illustrated by Exhibit 20, R. 1275) of the area irrigated under the 4(c) right of the Provo River Decree in
1921.

He assumed that the 4758 acres were subject to the

City's 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c) rights in 1921.

From that total

he subtracted all of the farm acreage subject to paragraph
4(a) of the Decree, and all of the city lot acreage of
paragraph 4(b), with a 33% adjustment in the 4(b) acreage to
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and buildings.

This adjustment operated in favor of the

appellants' interests in the calculations.

(R. 1272-1273).

Mr. Zirbes then made a further deduction for the 147 acres
of the First Ward Pasture, which was irrigated under the
separate right of paragraph 9 of the Provo River Decree.

As

a final deduction, he measured and subtracted 478 acres as
the

ar~a

occupied by roads existing in 1921.

After

accounting for all the land occupied by roads and by buildings
on City lots in 1921, and all the acreage irrigated under
other decreed rights, (4(a), 4(b) and 9), there remained a
total of 1407.87 acres unaccounted for by the acreage duties
for Provo City's irrigation rights under the Provo River
Decree.

(R. 1274).
INTROCUCTION TO ARGUMENT

The entire thrust of the appellants' arguments is that
the remand from this Court did not reverse the former summary judgment entered by Judge Sorensen.

This position is

basically unsound, for if the remand was not for the purpose
of finding additional facts and entering conclusions of law
based on those facts,

it was meaningless.

Judge Tibbs had

no alternative but to try the matter anew in order to find
the necessary facts and to enter conclusions of law accordingly.

Once the facts were found, the judgment which was

entered naturally and legally followed.
For the appellants to speak of the trial court in the
following language:
[of not following]

"ignoring the balance of the record",
"the remand of this Court while leading
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counsel all along to believe that it was going to do so,"
and in speaking of the summary judgment, "simply paid it lip
service in passing and thereafter ignored it," "and even
more shocking is the Court's conclusion that the Morse
Decree is not ambiguous",
of hand",

[which]

[the court] "let the case get out

"justice and fair play demand be rectified

by this Court on appeal," is to demean that competent Judge.
Such charges seriously impugn the quality of the appellants'
claims.

It was the appellants who did not want the Court to

know the facts and who wanted the Court to consider some of
the facts in a disjointed manner while ignoring facts that
they found to be inconsistent with their position.

It was

impossible for the Court to sift and sort the facts as the
appellants wanted, however, a review of all the facts clearly
discloses that the 4(c) water belonged to the respondent.
It must be noted that the manner in which the water was
obtained by appellants from 1969 to 1975 is not above
reproach.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COHPLIED WITH THE REI1AND OF THIS COURT
AND DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND JUDGf1ENT.
Appellants have argued this question four times under
the titles of Introduction and Points I, II and III, of their
brief.

Respondent believes it to be sufficient to reply to

all variations of appellants' argument under this single
point.
The language of this Court was that the case was "remanded
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to the District Court with the recommendation that the court
refer the matter to the State Engineer,etc."

It seems clear

that this Court intended a complete remand to the trial
court.

The above quoted language subsequent to "District

Court" are only words of recommendation and it is apparent
that by the use of the term "recommend", that this Court
intended to leave to the discretion of the trial court the
procedures necessary to conduct a trial concerning all of
the issues raised by the pleadings and the implications of
the remand.
This Court had previously stated in this same paragraph
as follows:
"It would seem to us that it would be helpful
in making a proper determination of what was
intended by the language set forth in the
Provo River Decree if the record contained
some information as to what use, if any, the
plaintiff had made of 16.5 second feet of water,
since its use in the operation of the various
mills had ceased.
It is therefore, ordered
that this matter be remanded to the District
Court. * * *"
Respondent and the trial court rightfully concluded
that the Court had to make a "proper determination of what
was intended by the language set forth in the Provo River
Decree, * * *"

For that reason, and giving ordinary con-

struction to the language of remand, the trial court conducted a trial de novo.

Any other procedure would have made

the remand a procedural exercise, if the trial court did not
have the power to enter findings and judgment consistent
with the facts established.
InQuinney
essence,
this forwas
a provided
remand
to the
district
court
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for

further proceedings to determine the factual issues involved.
Section 962 of Vol. 5, Am.Jur.2d, p. 389, discusses the
effect of a remand for further proceedings:
§962.
Remand for further proceedings; in
general.
If, because of the condition of therecord, the court on appeal cannot determine,
what judgment should justly be rendered, it
will ordinarily remand the case for further
proceedings in the trial court.
If the record
does not justify entry or direction of a decree, as where the bill or complaint is considered insufficient, or the evidence inadequate, to support a material issue, no final
decree is rendered in the appellate court except to the extent of setting aside the decree
in the lower court and requiring further proceedings to be had therein.
Although the Supreme Court die not specifically remand
for a new trial, its decision had the same effect.

The

State Engineer, by direction of the district court, has held
two "hearings" to determine the factual issues involved.
The "hearings" actually were "trials" by the State Engineer.
Needless to say, the State Engineer is not equipped or
trained to make rulings on evidence, testimony or legal
arguments.

Any findings or decisions made by him which were

contrary to the interests of the respective parties had to
be reviewed by the district court.

In addition to the scope

of the referral order, the State Engineer also conducted
some independent research which he presented to the trial
court in the form of testir.ony and evidence.

This additional

evidence, of necessity, reauired the Court, on review, to
conduct an evidentiary hearing (trial) and further, of
necessity, required the Court to make new findings of fact
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consistent with such new evidence.

The "remand", therefore,

had to take on the aspects of a new trial.
Section 963, Vol. 5 of Am.Jur.2d, p. 390, also discusses the effect of a remand for a new trial:
On reversing, the appellate court will
'ordinarily direct a new trial if, under the
circumstances of the case, this is required
to attain justice, and usually appellate
courts will not undertake to render a final
judgment in a case where questions of fact
are oresent even though it may have the power to do so. The necessity for a new trial
is deemed to exist whenever a jury verdict
might be different from what it was in a
trial where errors were committed. Accordingly, if the rights of the parties turn on
issues of fact as to which the evidence is
in conflict, the reviewing court in reversing will ordinarily not direct judgment to
be entered for either of the parties but
will remand to permit the facts to be re
solved by the proper fact-finding agency.
(Emphasis added).
In regard to the remand, appellants have cited as
authorities: Allred v. Allred, 12 Utah2d 325, 366 P.2d 478
(1961);

Rule 76(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; LeGrande

Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 18 Utah2d 260, 420 P.2d 615
(1966); and Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207 (Utah, 1976).
These authorities do not stand for the proposition for which
they are cited.

The substance of these cases is that once

further proceedings have been ordered, it is the duty of the
Supreme Court to pass upon all questions of law involved in
the case presented upon the appeal that are necessary for a
final determination in the lower court.

These cases do not

support the argument that the trial court thereby has no
latitute
for
inquiry
remand.
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The governing principles have been stated by this Court
in Koch v. J. C. Penney Companv, 534 P.2d .903, 905 (Utah,
1975) which cites Johnson, supra, and states:
It should be apparent that there is a dispute
between the Parties on mutual issues upon-which
rights depend, so there should be a trial and
both parties given an opportunity to adduce
their evidence. The comments in this opinion
on matters of law have been made because it is
appropriate to do so when a case is remanded
for trial.
But we do not desire to be understood as indicating any opinion as to how the
issues of fact should be resolved. (Emphasis
added).
See also Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974);
and

Russell v. Park Citv, 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274

(1973).
The appellants argue that the trial court had no authority at all to nake findings contrary to the previous Summary
Judgment.

If there were substance to this argument, then

the remand would have been a ridiculous imposition on the
trial court and of no assistance to the Supreme Court.

It

is respectfully submitted that there is no merit to appellants'
Point I.
It should also be noted that upon remand, Judge Sorenson, before he recused himself, interpreted the language of
the Supreme Court to mean that he would allow an evidentiary
trial, vis a vis, a legal argument based on motion for
Summary Judgment.

Judge Sorenson conducted a pre-trial

conference, and permitted extensive argument accompanied by
written briefs.

After full consideration, he allowed the

respondent to amend its complaint (R. 287,288) and to allege
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new matters,making a repeat judgment within the framework of
the original pleadings impossible.

How was Judge Tibbs to

dispose of these new pleadin?s by both the appellants and
respondent except by conducting a trial de novo?

Appellants

somehow find Judge Sorenson's original judgment sacrosanct,
but his decision after remand not worth mentioning.

It is,

however, important to note that they do not appeal from
Judge Sorenson's ruling allowing the amended complaint.
In Point III, appellants go on to contend that the
trial court's decision was unsupported by competent evidence,
Such a representation to this court is incredible.

The

course of appellants' argument, however, is not that there
was not evidence to support the

~rial

Court's findings but,

rather, that the trial court erred in taking evidence in
areas beyond what the appellants interpret to be the parameters of the Supreme Court's remand.

This again, is

the same argument that the respondent has heretofore twice
addressed.
To the extent that there seems to be any specificity to
this segment of appellants' appeal, we shall address such
claimed error as it is mentioned, particularly the allegations concerning Findings of Fact 12, 15 and 16.
Amended Finding

ll:

12.
From 1921 through August of 1969, all of
the Provo River Commissioners delivered Provo
City's riqhts under Paragraphs 4(a), (b) and
(c) as separate and distinct rights and treated
each right as being useable for irrigation purposes.
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to

the contrary.
Appellants seem to think that because there were times
when there was not sufficient water in the river to fulfill
all of Provo's 4(a),

(b) and (c) rights, that Provo City

did not receive its 4(c) water.

The argument seems to imply

that the Provo River Commissioner would first fill the 4(a)
and 4(b) rights and, if there were anything left, he would
apply it to 4(c).

This is not the fact.

(R. 751).

If, for

example, in the vernacular of the water men, the river was
an 80% river, then Provo would receive 80% of each of its
4(a), (b), and (c) rights.
The respondent asks this Court to consider the language
of this finding.

How the appellants, within the plain

syntax of paragraph 12, can conclude that such finding is in
error 92.5% of the time, etc. is a mystery to the respondent
and defies reply.

It is simply a false syllogism and as

such cannot be answered except to say it is logically unsound and contrary to the evidence at trial.
The testimony of Mr. Clark and all previous water cornmissioners from 1927 through August of 1969 was that the
4(c) water was for irrigation and was delivered accordingly.
(R. 757, 1086, 1108).

There is absolutely no variance

between fact and Amended Finding No. 12.
Amended Findina

12:

15.
During the years from 1921 to 1969, all of
the water delivered to Provo City by the Provo
River Commissioners was beneficially used and
there was no water wasted.
The
thatprovided
this
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years after the fact and, consequently, this testimony was
elicited from both elderly people who were familiar with the
stream flow from 1921 (R.
users (R.

1048, 1149).

1005-1135), augmented by present
The appellants describe the

of such users as Stubbs (R.

1005), Goddard (R.

knowled~

1135), and

Roberts (R. 1151) as casual observations.

Compare these casual observations with what the appellants
state are actual measurements.

The measurements referred to

on page 32 of their brief (R. 880-887) were simply weir
measurements made in the southwest part of Provo by Robert
White, an engineer of the Bureau of Reclamation.

All he

knew was what water was in the ditch at a given time.
made no effort to determine its source.

He

Consider the

following testimony by Mr. White:
R. 880, L. 13 to L.

22

Q,

How much of the water that you've measured
in those ditches or in those canals were return
flow?

A.
I have not made a study to determine how
much is return flow.
Q.
You say there was return water in the
ditches?
A.

There is.

Q.
By that term, you and I both understand
that that's water that's once been used for
irrigation purposes, do we not?
1\.

R.

Yes.

895 L. 4 to R.

896 L.

21

Q. Why do you put numbers on the ditches
different than the street numbers?
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A. When I first started out there, I noticed
in my notes the other day, I called it lOth
West. For some reason I changed it to 11th
Uest, but I don't know why.
Q. Can you tell us, in your measurements, how
much of the water that you measured was run-off
water frorn Rock Canyon?
A.

No, I can't.

Q.
Tell us how much was run-off from Slate
Canyon?

A. Slate Canyon is south of the city, and I
did not get into those ditches.
Can you tell us how much was run-off water
from Tirnp canal?

Q.

A.

No, I can't.

Q.

Or from the Upper East Union Canal?

A.

No.

Q.
Can you tell us how much of that water
entered the system because it was subsurface
water, just percolated up?

A.

No.

Q. Can you tell us how much of that water
was well flow water?
A.

No.

There were wells out there above your
measuring devices, were there not?

Q.

A. Yes, the purpose of this study was to
determine the in-flow to Provo Bay and these
are the flows that I found.
Q.
Did you determine how much of that water
was soring water?

A.

No.

There were springs, weren't there, in that
area - - in everyone of the areas that you
measured, there were springs?
Q.
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Q.
Now, when you say that the water in the
Mill race was high in the wintertime, is that
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Low in the summertime?

A..

Yes.

Q. Well, that just meant that whoever was
opening the gates was running the flood water
down the Mill race; isn't that true?
A.

That could have been.

The trial court was

~Tell

advised to take such "casual

observations" against the conclusions of such "scientific"
studies.
Amended Finding 16:
16. The State Engineer's report, which has
been submitted to the Court, is erroneous as
to the date when the Mills ceased operation.
The State Engineer's report used the early
1940's as the date when the Mills ceased operation while evidence presented at trial clearly
established the date as 1931; consequently,
the Court does not find a trend in the usage
of water in the Provo City system as mentioned
by the State Engineer in his report.
Somehow appellants think the respondent is responsible
for one of the State Engineer's major mistakes.

Most gal-

ling is the statement (p. 37 of Brief) that "he was led
error by Provo City withholding evidence from him".
assertion is totally untrue.

in~

This

At the time the engineer was

conducting his investigation, this information was unknown
to the respondent.

~his

was a material area that the

engineer was assigned to investigate by Judge Sorensen and
into which area this court recommended that he inquire.
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The

these

facts.

A superficial reading of his report would cause a

long time resident of Provo to note the obvious mistake.
After the inquiry, the respondent made an effort to find the
true facts which could have been found by anyone willing to
conduct a simple inquiry.
to anyone.

The facts were equally available

To say that the respondent led the engineer into

error by not doing his work for hin is unwarranted.
Be that as it may, appellants admit that the engineer
was off in his facts by over ten years, making Finding 16
absolutely true.
The appellants' observations concerning Findings 17 and
19 are immaterial to their appeal and, consequently, will
not be argued.

The argument made to Finding 20 is identi-

cal to their argument to Finding 16 and has been answered.
Suffice it to say that, in respect to each finding of
fact complained of, there was a plethora of believable
proof.

In the case of Bullock v. Hanks, 22 U.2d 308, 452

P.2d 866 (1969), a case involving this exact issue, this
Court expressly held that a trial de novo under U.C.A.
§73-3-15 is equitable in nature and that "the findings of
the court will be disturbed only if the evidence clearly
preponderates against them".

(452 P.2d at 868, n. 2).

rule is clearly established in all areas of Utah law.

This
See

e.g. Shields v. Dry Creek Irrigation Company, 8 U.2d 55, 61,
328 P.2d 175 (1958).

The respondent believes that the

appellants have failed to show that the evidence clearly
preponderates against the findings.
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POINT II
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 18 IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND IS NOT BARRED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF RES ADJUDICATA,
Contrary to appellants' assertion in Point IV of their
brief, there was ample evidence that Provo City, for all of
the time it was taking 4(c) water and before, irrigated
substantially in excess of 2558.51 acres.

The evidence

presented by the testimony of Wheadon (R. 967), the transcript
of Goddard, Swan, Thompson and Hentz (Ex. 2), Earl Stubbs,

(R. 1005) Leon Stubbs (R. 1060) Worwood (R. 1114), Goddard
(R. 1135) Larsen (R. 1149) Roberts

(R. 1158) Zirbes (R.

1270) and Exhibits 3, 18 and 19, all clearly demonstrate
that Provo City in 1921 had at least 4133 acres under
irrigation in addition to the First Ward Pasture.
20).

(Exhibit

Appellants simply refuse to allow that the abundant

evidence submitted by the respondent is believable, however,
the trial court obviously found it considerably more reliable
than that offered by the appellants.

The court had the

absolute right to weigh all of the evidence in accordance
with its significance and to consider the testimony of the
individual lay witnesses in conjunction, for example, with
the testimony of Wheadon and Zirbes.
Appellants' arguments seem to be that their evidence is
competent while the respondent offered "no competent" evidence,
In reply, we state that the evidence offered by the respondent was at least of equal quality and certainly of greater
quantity
than
thatFunding
of forthe
appellants.
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Appellants have stated their version of the facts and
their interpretation of their own evidence as if there were
no facts to the contrary, and rather, in the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

It seems beyond

argument that the trial court may determine which evidence
it cares to believe and that decision should be overturned
only upon a showing of clear error.
POINT III
THE PROVO RIVER DECREE, RE: 4(a), 4(b) AND 4(c) WATER
IS NOT AHBIGUOUS.
The court, in his pronouncement from the bench on
December 11, 1975, said:

"The Court concluded that the

Horse Decree is not ambiguous and that Provo City is entitled
to A, B, and C, rights for irrigation purposes even though
no acreage or duty figures are set forth on the C right".
The basis for the court's conclusion was that, after hearing
all the facts, he understood the reason that Judge Morse did
not attach a duty to the 4(c) right.

When one understands

the circumstances, it is clear that Judge Morse knew what he
was doing.
It seems apparent that the primary reason for not
attaching a duty to the 4(c) water is that it had to irrigate
the area contiguous to the shore of Utah Lake, which in 1921
was subject to major annual fluctuations.

At times there

would be hundreds of acres more of accretion land to be
irrigated, and at times of high water, hundreds of acres
less.
Consequently, it would have been impossible to attach
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an acreage duty to such water.
Judge Morse was an experienced trial judge.
at least

~

lawyers who

partici~ated

There were

in the trial during the

many years in which evidence was taken.

The record clearly

demonstrated that the trial was conducted with skill and to
professional standards.

After the trial, there were motions to amend the findings,
including one by Provo City to increase the duty on the
water awarded under 4(a) and 4(b) of the Decree.

It is

evident that the Findings and Decree were scrutinized by
Court and counsel with infinite care.

It is inconceivable

that the Court and counsel in 1921 did not understand the
meaning of Provision 4(c) or even more incredible, inadvertently and by mistake used these words in writing the
Decree:
"during the irrigation season" * * * "Which
water has been heretofore been used for irrigation purposes by the City * * *"
The defendants in this case would have the Court believe
that the reference to irrigation rights as set forth in
Findings of Fact Nos.

57 and 58 was just a coincidental

compounding of the error and mistake made by Judge Morse in
Provision 4(c) of the Decree.
At the time of the Decree, all the parties recognized
that the 16.5 c.f.s.

(4(c) water) was owned by Provo City

for irrigation purposes.

There was no dispute.

7his is why

they conceded and the Court adjudged the water to be Provo
City's for the purposes set forth in the Decree.

Those
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_,
upstream parties included the present defendants, Provo
Reservoir Hater Users Cor.1pany, and the predecessors in
interest of the Provo River Water Users Association.

The

principle of res adjudicata should bar the defendants from
now disputing such ancient fact.
§533, §534.

See 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments

It was also understood by the downstream users

that once Provo City took that 16.5 c.f.s. of water into
it's system, they had no clain upon it and Provo City was
not obliged in any way to return that water to the river.
The City took it into it's system for consumptive and beneficial use.

Those are the simple facts, otherwise the

language of the Decree would be meaningless.
POINT IV
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION 11AKES THE
ACTUAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DECREE FOR FIFTY YEARS RES
ADJUDICATA AND THE APPELLANTS BY REASON OF THEIR CONDUCT ARE
NOW ESTOPPED FRDr! DENYING THE TH!E HONORED INTERPRETATION.
It is a firmly established principal of law that if a
decree or judgment becomes the subject of dispute due to
ambiguity or misinterpretation, the Courts will look to the
common interpretation that the parties have recognized in
the past.

If one of the parties to a decree acquiesces to a

particular interpretation for many years, he is not pernitted to later complain of a different interpretation.
This is known as the doctrine of practical construction.
(See Annotation, 120 1\.L.P. 862).
The sane problem of the interPretation of a decree has
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developed in this case.

The Morse Decree, entered in 1921,

has now become a subject of dispute.

The defendants claim

that the water awarded under naragraph 4(c) of the Morse
Decree cannot be used for irrigation purposes.

They first

discovered this new interpretation in 1969, some 49 years
after the Decree was entered.
At ,this date, there are no witnesses alive that know of
their own personal knowledge the facts giving rise to the
Morse Decree.

All of the prior Provo City water masters

have passed away and only one prior Provo River Commissioner
is presently alive.

It would seem that the defendants are

guilty of laches in the extreme.

They should not now be

able to change the interpretation of a decree to which they
have acquiesced for almost fifty

years~

All of the defendants have had notice of the amounts of
water claimed and used by Provo City.

The rule of practical

construction is stated in Partten v. First National Bank &
Trust Comoanv, et al., 283 N.l•1. 403 (1938), where a probate
court decree entered pursuant to a District Court Judgment
did not in fact conform to the judgment of the District
Court.

An ambiguity arose because one of the clauses had

been omitted.

The Court stated:

The trustee accepted that construction as
the correct one and acted under it without
challenge or question for at least 12
years in the performance of its duties.
While there might be strong reasons for
holding that the plaintiffs are estopped to
question that construction of the judg~ent,
because of the position taken by the beneficiaries on the notion to amend, it is
clear
beyond
dispute
that
the ofparties
have
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solemnly adopted that construction of the
probate decree and acted under it until the
instant action was beaun. The construction
which the oarties hav~ placed uoon a judgment or decree ordinarily will not be changed
except for strong re=sons.
The same principle has been applied to the determination
of water rights.

In La Luz

Co~munity

Ditch Co. v •. Town of

Alamogordo, 34 N.M. 127, 279 P. 72 (1929), plaintiffs
brought suit for declaratory judgment of their rights under
an 1898 decree.

The defendants had waited approximately 30

years before disputing the plaintiff's claim to a .89 c.f.s.
water right that had been continuously delivered to the
plaintiff.

The Court upheld the historical or "practical

construction" of the Decree because of the defendant's
acquiescence over the years.

In respect to this principle,

the Court stated at page 77:
Appellant argues that, as the decree of
1898 is a judgment by consent, it is to be
regarded as a contract between the parties,
and must be construed as any other contract,
quoting from 34 C.J., p. 133 to the effect
that its operation and effect must be gathered from the terms used in the agreement,
and should not be extended beyond the clear
import of such terms, etc.
This does not helP appellant, because,
while the rule he cites is well recognized,
there is another one equally well established
to the effect that:
"If a contract is ambiguous in meaning, the practical construction
put upon it by the parties thereto, is of
great weight, even though the contract is in
writing, and ordinarily, is controlling, at
least if such Practical construction has
lasted for a l;na period of time."
Page on
the Law of Contr~c~s, §2034.
~e Hre in accorj with the rule thus
stated * * *
The court invoked the rule of Practical
construction placed by the rarties in interest
u~on doubtful or aMcigous terms in a contract,
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and concluded:
"That the construction which
the owners of the power for years placed upon
the terms of their grants, it arpearing that
such construction is reasonable and definite,
should and must prevail."
(emphasis added)
The principal of estoppel should also be considered in
determining the interpretation of the Decree (La Luz
Ditch, supra, page 78).

Communi~ 1

The City of Provo has developed

over the years with the impression that its decreed rights
were secure and could be used to meet future needs.

To help

understand the City's claim to the waters awarded under
paragraph 4(c), reference should be made to paragraph 58(c)
of the Findings of Fact which corresponds substantially to
paragraph 4(c) of the Decree.
(c)
That said defendant Provo City, during
the irrigation season of each and every
year, is the owner of the right to the use
of 16.5 c.f.s of water. Which water has
heretofore been used for irrigation purposes.
* * * (emphasis added).
If the respondent had understood that it did not own
the water and that it could not use the water for further
expansion, it would have purchased more water when Deer
Creek Reservoir was built or would have acquired water
rights from other sources to supplement the present supply.
By not raising their objections forty (40) years ago when
the mills stopped, the defendants are now estopped from tryi~
to deprive Provo City of its water.
CONCLUSION
Respondent does not dispute any of the authorities
cited by the appellants except to state that, where they are
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the

true holding of the case is different, as we have pointed
out.

Where appellants use authorities for general pro-

positions, the respondent has had no dispute with the proposition.

In short, in spite of the size of the record and

the significance of the issues, this is a case in which the
appellants have not been able to cite any case in point for
their contentions.
In respect to the facts, the appellants have attempted
to develop a set of "facts" which they could argue.

They

did so by dividing their "facts" into categories, two of
which, B and C, were not facts before the Trial Court.

It

was on these "facts" that appellants have attempted to build
their case on appeal.

The true facts, those elicited from

witnesses and evidence submitted to the trial court, the
appellants have, in large, chosen to ignore.
Respondents submit that the Trial Court had before it
ample evidence in support of each and every finding it made.
Further, the judgment entered was well within the purview of
the remand and is not outside the law.

Such a conclusion

is also supported by the doctrines of res adjudicata and
practical construction.
Respectfully submitted this

/£ :l.f

day of

Ajt-1/ ,

1977.
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